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Abstract
Any multiuser system has to enforce access control for protecting its resources
from unauthorized access or damage. One way for specifying access control is in
a separate policy speciﬁcation language. An access control system maintains a
repository of policies, receives access requests, consults the policy and returns a
response specifying whether the request was permitted or denied. However, it is
challenging to specify a correct access control policy and so, it is common for the
security of a system to be compromised because of the incorrect speciﬁcation of
these policies. There are many ways in which a policy can be checked for correct-
ness like, formal veriﬁcation, analysis and testing. In this thesis, a systematic and
automatic tool for policy testing is provided. Testing a policy involves formulating
requests that represent test cases for the policy, evaluating the policy with those
test cases (requests) and comparing the responses obtained with actual expected
results.
In the approach to policy testing, we conducted the change-impact analysis for
generating the requests, and mutation testing for testing the speciﬁed policy. The
testing framework called ACPC (Access Control Policy Checker), used Margrave
tool to perform change-impact analysis for generating requests. We have choosen
like previous work [22] an access control speciﬁcation language, Extensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML).
We conducted experiments using nine policy sets to evaluate the eﬀectiveness
by the framework. The experimental result shows that ACPC can eﬀectively
generate requests to achieve high structural coverage of policies and outperforms
random requests generation in terms of structural coverage and fault-detection
capability. We have used nine mutation operators to make the mutant policy for
mutation testing. We found the better result by classify these mutation operator
in to three classes. We got up to 98% of mutant killed by one class of mutation
operator, this results shows that, the classiﬁcation gives better performance in
terms of cost and time.
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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Any type of system, having diﬀerent users, need to have a access control system
for authorized access and prevention of harm. Access Control System which is
specifying separately in the system by a separate policy speciﬁcation is a solution
for that problem. Access Control System contains the diﬀerent policies, whose
work is to receive access requests then it consults to the policy and then returns
a response, specifying that the user request is permitted or denied.To implement
these access control policies are not an easy task, because of the huge system
requirement. For checking the correctness of the policies which is deployed into
the system are very diﬃcult. In this thesis, a systematic and automated toll [22]
for policy testing is implemented, For test a policy it involve generation of test
cases, evaluation of policies with respect to those test cases and at last comparison
between the existing approaches.
The advantages of using policy speciﬁcation languages have led to the devel-
opment of many speciﬁc and generic policy languages. Ponder [1] is an object
oriented policy speciﬁcation language for distributed systems management. En-
terprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [2] is a formal language used to
specify ﬁne-grained enterprise privacy policies. Extensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) [3] is a general purpose policy language and an access re-
quest/response language deﬁned using Extensible Markup Language (XML) for
managing access to resources. The XACML speciﬁcation in its XML format en-
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ables access policies to be transportable and also inter operable across various
access control systems.
As an example, consider the case of ﬁrewall policies. Firewalls are one mech-
anism for securing network resources. It is common for miss conﬁgured ﬁrewall
policies to be causing problems. In examining 37 ﬁrewalls in production enterprise
networks in 2004, Wool found that all the ﬁrewalls were miss conﬁgured and vul-
nerable [4]. In addition, the study states, ”The protection that ﬁrewalls provide
is only as good as the policy they are conﬁgured to implement. Analysis of real
conﬁguration data shows that corporate ﬁrewalls are often enforcing rule sets that
violate well established security guidelines”. The wide and continued spread of
worms such as Blaster and Sapphire, demonstrated that many ﬁrewalls were miss
conﬁgured, because ”well-conﬁgured ﬁrewalls could have easily blocked them”.
There can be many anomalies and inconsistencies in the policy which make the
network resources vulnerable to security attacks. Also, ﬁrewall rules are developed
over a period of time. New rules are periodically added as more resources with
new constraints are added to the network. It is diﬃcult to check for conﬂicts or
overlaps of new rules with existing rules. Similar problem exists in access control
policies of enterprises and other systems. An enterprises’ security policy is also
revised over time as new security requirements are added. Therefore, it is critical
to specify access control policies correctly, which however is a challenging problem.
There are various ways in which the quality of the policy can be assured like,
formal veriﬁcation, analysis and testing. Formal veriﬁcation techniques can verify
if a policy satisﬁes a particular security property [5, 6]. However, a formal repre-
sentation of the policy is not scalable and properties about a policy do not exist
in practice. Analysis of policies can include semantic analysis like performing a
change impact analysis between two policies [7]. Testing is one practical way for
checking the correctness of a policy speciﬁcation. Semantic analysis techniques
can be used complementary to testing.
Access control is traditionally enforced by directly hard coding into a system.
However, this is tedious and becomes diﬃcult for a large system. Also, this makes
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it hard to accommodate changes of security requirements in a system. Recently,
access control system increasingly separate policy from mechanisms. That is, an
access control policy is explicitly speciﬁed using certain policy languages. And a
system dynamically consults the policy to determine whether an access request
should be granted. The advantage of this is that by separating policy from mech-
anism makes it easier to specify the protection requirements to be enforced on
the system independent of the underlying implementation details. Also, when the
security requirements on the system change later on, it is possible to easily change
the policy without aﬀecting the underlying mechanism implementing it.
There is the existing policy testing techniques. Martin, Xie, and Yu [8] have
developed a random test generation tool for XACML policies. The tests (requests)
are generated as a set of all combination of attributes found in the policy. The tool
represents this attribute as a bit vector and an attribute appears in the request
only if the corresponding bit in the vector is set to 1. The number of requests to
be generated can be user speciﬁed. To achieve adequate coverage, even in a small
request set, they modify the random bit setting algorithm to ensure each bit is
set at least once. This method, though simple to implement is not ensure that a
policy is thoroughly tested.
In our approach to policy testing, we generate policy requests by the Chang-
Impact analysis tool margrave and mutation testing method for testing the access
control policies[22].
1.2 Literature Review
In this section, we discuss related work to access control models, polices and other
techniques that are used for analyzing access control polices[6].
1.2.1 Policies, Models and Mechanisms
Any system implementing access control must consider the three abstractions [9]:
1 Security Policy: This deﬁnes high level rules according to which access to
resources and data within a system will be granted or denied. An example of a
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security policy used at a school could be the TA can assign only internal grades.
2 Security Model: This gives a formal representation of how the access
control security policy is implemented in the system. This can be used to give
a proof of the properties provided by the system. It can be said that the model
bridges the gap in abstraction between policy and mechanism [10]. An example
security model is the mandatory access control model, where the level of access
of an entity depends on the security clearance level assigned to it like top secret,
secret, normal.
3 Security Mechanism: This deﬁnes the actual system speciﬁc functions
that implement the controls imposed by the policy and formally stated in the
model. An example security mechanism is access control lists.
1.2.2 Access control models
Access control models are grouped into three main classes: discretionary model,
mandatory model and role based model. Our approach to policy testing can be
applied to all policies build on any of these models.
Discretionary Policy Model
In discretionary access control [11], a list of authorizations is speciﬁed for each
subject in the system. The system gives access to a subject by looking up whether
a subject has access to an object in the authorizations speciﬁed. Diﬀerent subjects
can have diﬀerent levels of access to one object. In this model, the users have the
discretion of granting or revoking privileges to other users. The access matrix
model is used for describing discretionary access control. In access matrix, the
rows are the subjects in the system and the columns are resources to which a
subject’s access has to be controlled. The cell intersecting the row and column
will specify the access level of the subject to the resource. This matrix model can
be implemented as,
• Authorization table : Here the authorizations are represented as a table.
This is mostly used in databases by creating a table with columns subject,
resource and action. Each entry in the table represents an authorization.
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• Access control list : In an access control list implementation, every col-
umn in the access matrix is a list.(i.e) There is a list for each object in the
system specifying the subjects that have access to that particular object.
• Capability list : In a capability list implementation, every row in the
access matrix is a list. (i.e.) there is a list for each subject in the system
specifying the diﬀerent objects that the particular object has access.
Each implementation has its own advantages and disadvantages and a partic-
ular implementation is chosen depending on the needs of the speciﬁc application.
Discretionary policies however are not secure against attacks from the processes
invoked by legitimate users that may perform malicious functions on behalf of the
user. An example of this vulnerability is a trojan horse program that is executed
by a subject like a high level user that reads from one sensitive ﬁle and writes to
another common ﬁle to which a lower level user has read access. Now the low level
user will be able to read the contents of the sensitive ﬁle.
Mandatory policy model
Mandatory policies classify the subjects and objects within the system into
diﬀerent security clearance levels. The various mandatory policies based on the
semantics of the classiﬁcation are,
• Secrecy-based mandatory policies : these control the ’direct and in-
direct ﬂow of information to the purpose of preventing leakages to unau-
thorized subjects’ [11]. Users can connect to the system at diﬀerent levels
and the two Bell La Pendula principles to be satisﬁed are: No-read-up and
No-write-down. Enforcing this restriction ensures that no information ﬂow
exists from one level to another.
• Integrity based mandatory policy : The Biba model protects the in-
tegrity of a resource. The integrity classiﬁcation reﬂects the trustworthiness
of the user in modifying the information and for an object it refers to the
trustworthiness placed on the data provided by the system. Access control
is enforced by the following two principles: No-read-down and no-write-up.
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Enforcing this principle safeguards the integrity by ensuring that objects at
a lower level which are less reliable cannot write to levels above it.
Hence, secrecy policies allow the ﬂow of information from lower to higher se-
crecy classes while integrity policies allow the ﬂow of information from higher to
lower integrity classes. So to ensure both secrecy and integrity both the classes
must be deﬁned.
Though mandatory policies provide protection against information leakages,
they cannot guarantee complete secrecy because they do not oﬀer protection from
covert channel communication.
Mandatory and discretionary polices are combined and the Chinese wall pol-
icy model is deﬁned. This policy model was proposed to enforce the mandatory
control on discretionary policy implementations found in commercial systems. It
combines mandatory and discretionary policies. The classiﬁcation class restricting
the information ﬂow here reﬂects the ﬂow of information between conﬂicting busi-
ness classes for an individual consultant. Here, access to data is not constrained
by its classiﬁcation but by what data a subject has already accessed. Though this
policy has some limitations of mandatory policies like being rigid in a commercial
setting, this is a good example of applying ’dynamic separation of duty constraints
present in the real world and has been taken as a reference in building subsequent
policies and models’ [11].
Other work combining discretionary and mandatory access control include au-
thorization based information ﬂow policies. Also, discretionary policies have been
modiﬁed for expanding authorizations to support conditions in the policy. Also,
authorizations can be extended with temporal constraints.
Another aspect of access control is the administrative policies which specify
who is authorized to manage the access rules and decisions. In mandatory, there
must be a centralized authority specifying the security class of the objects. In the
case of discretionary, there can be diﬀerent subjects like, centralized, hierarchical,
cooperative, ownership and decentralized.
Role based policy model
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Role based access control (RBAC) [12, 13] specify access based on what roles
the users of the system assume. In [14] gives a novel framework and its supporting
tool that generates tests based on change-impact analysis which is the model in
this thesis. In this thesis we have used this paper as a main reference.
1.2.3 Policy Speciﬁcation Languages
The policy testing technique can be applied to other policy speciﬁcation languages
also. Here, we describe some of the common policy speciﬁcation languages [6].
Figure 1.1: Ponder Authorization policy syntax
Figure 1.2: Ponder Authorization policy example
Ponder Policy Speciﬁcation Language
Ponder was developed as part of an academic project at Imperial College in Lon-
don. Ponder is a declarative object oriented policy speciﬁcation language. It is
more suitable for access control enforcement in distributed and network systems.
They separate policy from implementation and enable dynamic management of
the policies [6]. The key terms are,
• Subject :Subject refers to users or principles or any other automated entity
which has a management responsibility.
• Target :Target refers to resources or services in the system.
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• Domains :Domains provide a way for grouping subjects or targets.
Ponder speciﬁes the following types of polices for expressing access control,
• Authorization policies : These are the access control policies specifying
what targets a subject can access. The policy can express both positive and
negative authorizations. The positive authorization policies specify what
actions a subject can perform while negative authorization speciﬁes those
actions a subject is forbidden from performing. The Figure 1.1 gives the
syntax of the authorization policy.
The university policy can be represented in the Figure 1.2 as,
• Information ﬁltering policies : These policies place restrictions on the
actions performed. They can be used to provide an additional level of re-
striction in addition to an authorization policy that grants an action.
• Delegation polices : This policy enables one user to delegate access rights
to another user.
• Refrain policies : Refrain policies deﬁne the actions that subjects must
not perform on target objects even though they may actually be permitted
to perform the action. They are similar to negative authorization policies
but are enforced on the target rather than on the subject.
• Obligation policies : These policies specify the actions that need to be
performed by managers when certain events occur within the system.
Ponder also supports various constraints like basic policy constrains and meta-
policy constraint. Basic policy constraints are expressed in terms of a predicate
which has to evaluate to true for the policy to apply. Meta-policies are used
to specify policies about policy and the constraints are on self management and
separation of duty. With all the above features, a large enterprise can structure
its access control policy. Ponder also provides other features to enable the ease of
management of large complex policies. We can specify groups for packaging related
9
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policies, roles for semantic grouping of policies with common subjects. Also, they
support policy hierarchies and the policy types can be specialized and reused.
Relationships can also be deﬁned showing the deﬁnition of roles participating in
interactions.
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is a speciﬁcation from the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C) for specifying the privacy policies of enterprises. Though
the speciﬁcation is platform independent and can be used across enterprises, it
is not a general purpose speciﬁcation. The P3P policies are higher level policies
usually published by an enterprise to reveal their privacy practices to customers.
Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL)
Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) was developed at Interna-
tional Business Machines (IBM). It is submitted for review to W3C. EPAL is
mainly designed as a privacy policy interoperability language suitable for exchange
between enterprises in a structured format. The language is appropriate for rep-
resenting the data-handling practices and policies within and between enterprises
that want to have a systematic way of managing privacy. This is also useful for
automatic audit control of the accesses to the information and also for enforc-
ing accountability of privacy practices. EPAL deﬁnes the attributes as a list of
Figure 1.3: EPAL policy example
hierarchies of,
• data-categories : This speciﬁes the diﬀerent ways in which the diﬀerent
data collected by an enterprise is used depending on the sensitivity of the
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data. For example, the medical-record data is more sensitive than the con-
tact information.
• user categories : This categorizes the diﬀerent users of the data. In the
above example, the medical record information is used by the doctor and
the contact information is used by the sales department.
• purposes : This speciﬁes the purpose for which the categorized data is used
by the categorized user. The doctor will use the medical record for purpose
of scheduling tests and the sales department will use the contact information
for shipping purposes.
They also deﬁne actions, obligations and conditions. Actions specify how the
data is used, obligations specify what must be satisﬁed in the environment and
conditions must evaluate to true in the context for the rule to be applicable. An
EPAL policy is a list of rules that are ordered according to descending precedence.
The Figure 1.3 gives the example for an EPAL policy
A study comparing XACML and EPAL concludes that EPAL uses a lot of
XACML and that EPAL is a subset of XACML except for some speciﬁc features.
For instance, EPAL and XACML share the same framework of a policy made up
of a series of rules. A rule is applicable only if the condition in it evaluates to
true and the eﬀect of the rule is returned. Also, both languages share the same
framework for the requests: a request is made up of a collection of attribute values.
1.2.4 Policy Testing Techniques
Martin et al [14] have developed a systematic method for testing access control
policies which we have taken in thesis for analysis. Theirs is the ﬁrst work on
deﬁning and measuring structural coverage of access control policies for testing.
They have developed a coverage measurement tool for measuring policy coverage
given a set of XACML policies and set of requests. Their coverage criterion is
based on the structure of the policies and is similar to statement coverage in a
program. The request generation process is random and the requests are got by
11
1.2 Literature Review
setting bits in a vector of policy attribute values. Even though the random request
generation technique does not repeat requests that are already generated, this
method has the disadvantage of using the random test input selection strategy.
They use a tool to greedily reduce requests from the generated set of requests
based on the coverage measure. They also perform mutation testing to analyze
the fault detection capability of the reduced set of requests. Techniques [15] have
been proposed to leverage mutation testing to automatically generation and/or
reduce test sets for general purpose programming languages. L. J. Morell [16]
gives the brief discussion in fault based testing for software, that is used frequently
now a days. Software abstractions [17] book written by Daniel Jackson give idea
about logic ans analysis In our approach, we developed automatically generation
of requests based on Change-Impact analysis tool i.e. Margrave and Mutation
testing technique for testing the policies.
Another area where access control policy testing is done is ﬁrewalls protect-
ing network resources. Al-Shaer et al [18] propose automated testing of ﬁrewalls
with respect to their internal implementation and security policies. They propose
a novel ﬁrewall testing technique using policy-based segmentation of the traﬃc
address space, which can intelligently adapt the test traﬃc generation to target
potential erroneous regions in the ﬁrewall input space. Though this method is ef-
ﬁcient, it is applicable only to ﬁrewall polices because they have made the testing
dependent on the structure of the access control policy in a ﬁrewall. However,
the idea of analyzing the logs of packets/request cannot be applied as such to any
general purpose access control system.
1.2.5 Formal Policy Analysis
A complementary approach to access control policy testing is to convert the policy
to a logical representation and use formal analysis techniques for veriﬁcation and
analysis. Hughes and Bultan translated XACML policies to their logical represen-
tation in the Alloy language and checked their properties using the Alloy Analyzer.
Using their translator and the Alloy analyzer, it is possible to check a policy which
is implemented as a combination of sub-polices correctly reproduces the properties
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of the sub policies. This approach, though produces good results does not scale
well with increase in the size of the policy. Zhang et al propose a mechanism for
evaluating XACML polices through model checking. They evaluate whether the
policies give legitimate users enough permissions to reach their goals and also to
check whether the policies prevent intruders from reaching their malicious goals.
However, the access control polices have to be translated to the RW language to
apply their techniques. The limitations of these above approaches are that they
do not treat all the features of XACML. Also, a predeﬁned set of properties about
the policy should be given which, does not exist in practice. Also, this analysis can
become intractable when there are more attributes in the policy. The advantage
of using testing is that no translation to a separate domain is needed to check the
policies [19]. Also, all features of XACML can be tested.
Margrave is an eﬃcient tool that enables checking for semantic consistencies
in the policy and returns counter examples representing cases which are causing
violation of properties of the policy. Change impact analysis is done between two
policies to determine the properties of the policy. They construct a multi-terminal
binary decision diagram to represent the rules in the policy. However this tool does
not support all features of XACML.
We have implemented the framework [22] for testing access control policies by
generating good quality of request suites and mutation testing method. Hennessy
and Power [30] propose a strategy for the construction of test suites for grammar
based software. The reduction criterion they use is based on the rule coverage of
the test suites. They analyze if the code coverage and fault detection capability
are reduced because of the reduced test suite. Martin et al [19] have developed a
tool for the automated testing. They deﬁne a coverage measure for the diﬀerent
condition. Kapfhammer and Soﬀa [20] deﬁne a framework for testing database
driven applications and the control ﬂow between various entities in such an appli-
cation. They deﬁne the test adequacy criteria for the database application based
on the database interaction ﬂow graph showing the interaction between the various
entities.
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1.3 Problem Deﬁnition
Sensitive data are increasingly available on-line through the Web and other dis-
tributed protocols.
To increase the conﬁdence in the correctness of speciﬁed policies, policy de-
velopers can conduct policy testing by supplying typical test inputs (request) and
subsequently checking test output (responses) against expected ones to enhance
the correctness of speciﬁed policies [towards]. Testing of Access Control Policies
along with the Application program is not a worthful practice. Unlike Software
Testing we have the tools and technique for Access Control Policy Testing. Un-
fortunately, manual testing is tedious and time consuming job [6].
1.4 Objective
Our goal is to ﬁnd out a signiﬁcant framework by which we can assure the correct-
ness of Access Control Policies for the better application development [19]. We
need to generate better tests set (requests) for better testing result and comapre
the results with the existing technique. In this thesis we focus on these areas.
1.5 Thesis Layout
The Thesis is organized as follows, Chapter 2 provides the information on various
components of an access control system and policy speciﬁcation languages. In
Chapter 3, we explain the framework for access control policy testing which
includes request generation process and policy testing process. Implementation of
the framework is explained in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the results of our
evaluation and comparison with other method. We conclude and give direction
for future work followed by bliographies.
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Chapter 2
Access Control Polices and
Enforcement
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we give an overview of the various components that make up an
access control system and an introduction to policy speciﬁcation languages [6].
The Figure 2.1 shows the various functional components of any system protecting
its resources by enforcing access control. The user makes a request to the entity
protecting the resources in the system, the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The
PEP forms the appropriate access control request in a format applicable to the
Policy based on the attributes of the requester, the action sought, the resource
requested and the environment and gives it to the Policy Decision Point (PDP).
The PDP looks up the policy that applies to the request and returns a response
to the PEP. The PEP then returns the corresponding decision to the requester.
The advantage of using this abstract model is that any application can use this
system.
There can be various vulnerabilities in a system implementing access control.
For example, the user has to ﬁrst be properly authenticated into the system. Then
the PEP should correctly perform the translation from the user or application spe-
ciﬁc request to that speciﬁc to the policy. This is vulnerability because the policy
speciﬁcation language may be more expressive for specifying an application’s se-
curity requirements. For example, XACML allows a set of subjects to request
access to a set of resources. But an application can have a strict requirement that
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only one subject can access one resource at a time. In these cases, the PEP imple-
mentation should be correctly implemented to be aware of this restriction when
performing the translation from the user’s request to a policy speciﬁc request.
Next, the access control policies have to correctly specify the intended behaviour
of the system. Also, the PDP has to perform the evaluation correctly.
Figure 2.1: Functional Components of an Access Control System
Among these vulnerabilities, one of the most basic requirements is to ensure
that the security policy is speciﬁed correctly.
In this thesis, we focus on the problem of ensuring that the access control
policies are speciﬁed correctly. A policy is considered to be correctly speciﬁed
when it satisﬁes all the properties of the system. An example of a property is that
a particular subject should not access certain resources. These properties can be
explicitly and formally expressed and formal analysis techniques like resolution
theorem proving can be used to prove if a property holds in a policy. However,
such properties of a policy do not exist in practice and it is diﬃcult to infer such
properties in a large system. Also, the formal analysis techniques are not scalable.
A practical way for ensuring the correctness of the policy is to test the policy
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against a set of requests and check if the responses obtained are as expected. This
is the policy testing approach which is followed in this work [11].
2.2 Secutiry Policy
The security policy in an access control system provides a systematic way for
specifying the strategy and practices for ensuring the security, integrity and avail-
ability of resources in an information system. In this section, we will give a brief
overview of policy speciﬁcation languages and describe XACML which we will be
using for illustrating our approach to testing [6].
2.2.1 Policy Speciﬁcation Languages
Previously access control policies were written by hard coding directly into the
program by the programmer. Later on, as the policies became more and more
complicated, separate policy speciﬁcation languages were developed. There are
many policy speciﬁcation languages and they can be either generic or speciﬁc to
applications. Generic policy speciﬁcation languages are designed for enforcing
access control in broad domains like distributed policy management, protecting
the privacy of enterprises, etc. Jajodia et al [21] propose a logical language for a
model that allows the speciﬁcation of diﬀerent access control policies.In [22] they
have used XACML as language and tool for testing, an access control language
for web services [23], etc.
The framework for policy testing is general and can be used for testing access
control policies speciﬁed in other rule-based systems. In this thesis we present the
approach in the context of one of the generic speciﬁcation language XACML.
2.2.2 XACML
XACML provides a standardized way of expressing authorization polices and a
standard format for expressing queries over these policies [19].
We have chosen to illustrate our approach to policy testing using XACML
because it is a general purpose speciﬁcation language with various advantages for
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enforcing access control like,
• It is an open source standard ratiﬁed by the Organization for the Advance-
ment of Structured Information Standards (OASIS). Because it is a standard,
the various features of XACML have been examined by experts and so the
speciﬁcation is stable. Also, it is expected to be used widely in the industry
because of its ratiﬁcation.
• XACML is speciﬁed in XML format which is used for e-business applications
for Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) in business-to-business and business-
to-consumer transactions. Because of this, these applications can be easily
conﬁgured to exchange or share XACML policies for enforcing access control.
• The speciﬁcation is ﬂexible and extensible. It is ﬂexible since it is a generic
standard and can be applied for specifying policies in all applications. It is
extensible because the data types, functions, attribute types, and the way for
combining multiple applicable rules/polices can be extended. Also currently
there is work on developing an XACML proﬁle for Web Services, SAML and
LDAP. This shows the language is adaptable to diﬀerent environments.
• It is a portable standard. Since the speciﬁcations are in XML format, it can
be used across applications.
• Conceptually it follows the PDP and PEP model which makes it applicable
to many application environments.
• It supports distributed policies. The security policy of an enterprise may
be enforced at diﬀerent points and there is a need for specifying distributed
policies.
XACML follows the abstract model as shown in Figure 2.1 for policy enforce-
ment deﬁned by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [24].
The speciﬁcation deﬁnes the PEP (Policy Evaluation Point) and PDP (Policy
Decision Point) as any other access control implementation. The request is given
to a PEP which processes it and converts it to an XACML request format and
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gives it to the PDP. The PDP has access to the policies and it gets the request
and determines if it has to give access to the policy or not. The PDP and PEP
implementation is dependent on the application. They may be in the same ap-
plication or be as separate entities on diﬀerent applications or be available as a
service over a network.
XACML Constructs
All XACML polices contain either a Policy or Policy Set as the basic element.
A Policy is composed of a set of Rules. A set of policies or policy sets are combined
to form a Policy Set. Figure 2.2 shows these main components and the hierarchical
relation between Policy Sets, Policies, Rules and Conditions in XACML. When
there are multiple rules in the policy and multiple policies/policy sets in a policy
set, it is possible that a single access request can be applied to multiple rules to
return conﬂicting access decisions. The way these conﬂicts must be resolved is
dependent on the speciﬁc application’s policy. However, XACML speciﬁes some
standard rule and policy combining algorithms for this. They are,
• First Applicable : Among the set of rules (policies), this returns the eﬀect
of the rule (policy) that ﬁrst evaluated to true. Here, the ordering of the
rules is important.
• Permit Overrides and Deny Overrides : In the set of rules (policies)
in a policy (policy set), if a rule (policy) evaluates to true and if its eﬀect
is permit then the result of the rule (policy) combination is permit. If the
eﬀect of the rule (policy) is deny or if it is not applicable then all the rules
(policies) in the set are evaluated to check if there is any permit rule (policy)
evaluating to true. If such a rule exists, a permit decision is returned, if not a
deny decisions is returned if none of the permit rules are applicable. Hence,
here permit rules are given precedence. Similarly the deny overrides rule
(policy) combining algorithm is deﬁned.
• Only One Applicable : This combining algorithm is deﬁned for combining
policies in a policy set. If no policy is applicable or more than one policy
is applicable, the result is deﬁned as not applicable and in determinant. If
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only one policy in the policy set is applicable for a request then the result
of the policy is returned.
Figure 2.2: Components of XACML Policy
The permit overrides and deny overrides combining algorithms can be speciﬁed
to be ordered requiring that the rules be evaluated in the order in which they are
speciﬁed. In addition to the above, user-deﬁned combining algorithms can also
be added. A Rule is the most elementary unit of a Policy. A rule is made of the
elements, Target, Eﬀect and the optional Condition element. A Target deﬁnes a
set of Subject, Resource and Actions elements for which the rule is intended to
apply. The Eﬀect speciﬁes the access decision as permit or deny that is returned on
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the successful evaluation of the rule. The Condition element can include complex
functions that further reﬁne the applicability of the rule. The policy itself can have
a target specifying the applicability of the policy. In this case, this target can be
thought of as an index into the policy. The index can be the common criteria that
have to be satisﬁed for the set of rules in the policy to be applicable. When there
are a number of policies each with a number of rules, the index of each policy helps
to speed up the evaluation of a decision request by ﬁrst checking the applicable
policy targets and then evaluating the rules in those policies. A policy set may be
used for semantically grouping policies/policy sets. For example, grouping those
policies deﬁning authorization for a particular object/subject, etc. A policy set
also includes a target element which again be used as an index for checking the
applicability before evaluation of all the constituent elements [11].
The other essential constructs in an XACML policy are attributes, attribute
values and functions. Attributes are named values of known types. The Subject,
Resource, Action and Environment of a given access requests are described by
attributes. A request will mostly contain a set of attributes. These are com-
pared with the corresponding attribute values in the policy and an access decision
is made. A request can match the attributes in the policy by using the At-
tributeDesignator type which identiﬁes attributes by their name and type. The
AttributeSelector is used for matching a request with the attribute values in the
policy through an XPath query. The attributes values can be operated on by
a number of functions like string comparison, date and time functions, logical
functions, numeric conversions, set functions, bag functions, etc and the values
returned can be compared to arrive at an access decision [6].
An Example Policy
In this section, we describe an example XACML policy [14] in a university.
Figure 2.3 shows a simpliﬁed form of this policy with the major XACML compo-
nents. This policy describes the way in which the access to the grade resource is
controlled in a university. The policy has an empty target, which means that by
default the set of rules in the policy are applicable for any request. The target of
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Figure 2.3: An example XACML policy
the policy in general is used as an index for the rules. In the above example, the
target could have been used to restrict the policy to be speciﬁc to a university as
shown in Figure 2.4.
There are three rules in the policy and a ﬁnal fall through rule. The three
rules are combined based on the permit overrides rule combining algorithm. This
means that set of rules are combined giving precedence to rules with an eﬀect of
permit.
Figure 2.4: XACML policy target for a university’s policy
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Figure 2.5: XACML Request
Figure 2.6: XACML Response
XACML Request and Response context
The XACML Request and Response context speciﬁes the standard format with
which a request and response from the system is got. The Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show
a simpliﬁed form of an XACML Request and Response. The request enables a
set of subjects, resource and action elements to be speciﬁed. In this example,
the student requests access to view the grade resource. The response is returned
on evaluating the request against the set of rules in the policy. In this example,
a decision is returned on matching the attribute values in the request with the
attribute values in the rule 3 in the policy.
2.2.3 MARGRAVE tool
In this paper, we used a suite called Margrave for Change-Impact Analysis of
Access Control Policies written in the XACML standard. Margrave has two com-
ponents [6]:
1. A veriﬁcation system that consumes a policy and property and determines
whether the policy satisﬁes the property. (More generally, this can be used
as a query engine to investigate the behavior of a policy.)
2. A system for change-impact analysis. The analysis consumes two policies
that span a set of changes and summarizes the diﬀerences between the two
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policies. Users can not only examine the summary, but also query it and
verify properties of the change. This veriﬁcation can happen even in the
absence of formal properties about the system as a whole. (Indeed, these
properties may not even hold of the entire system.)
We have implemented the idea of change-Impact analysis for generating the
request suites. Let’s see how the change-Impact analysis component works.
Change-Impact Analysis
Given two versions of a policy, change-impact analysis tool outputs counterex-
amples that illustrate semantic diﬀerences between the two policies. More specif-
ically, each counterexample represents a request that evaluates to a diﬀerent re-
sponse when applied to the two policy versions. For example, a particular request
revaluates to permit for policy p but the same request evaluates to deny for pol-
icy p’. Change-impact analysis is usually performed on mature policies that are
undergoing maintenance or updates to avoid accidental injection of anomalies. In
our case, we exploit the functionality of change-impact analysis to automatically
generate access requests by iteratively manipulating the inputs to a change-impact
analysis tool. We use tool Margrave’s API [25] to perform a change-impact analysis
on the original policy and each of the policy versions. Based on the counterexam-
ple produced by Margrave, the request generator generates request. Exactly one
request is generated from each version. Margrave package running in PLT scheme
with Drscheme package and for generation counterexample CUDD tool [26] is
necessary.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied the basic languages tool and concepts which is re-
quired for testing the Access Control Policies. We have seen basic Functional
Components of an Access Control System, Security Policies, XACML (eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language) in which we made access control policies, and
MARGRAVE tool which is used to perform change-impact analysis for request
generation.
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Chapter 3
Policy Testing Framework
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe the framework [22] followed for policy testing. We
also describe the technique for policy testing in brief. We have given name Access
Control Policy Checker (ACPC) to that testing framework. ACPC has used the
concept of mutation testing, generally used in software testing and Change-Impact
Analysis method for generating the good quality of request suites.
3.2 Proposed Policy Testing Framework
ACPC (Access Control Policy Checker) is the model [14] for the automated testing
the correctness of the Access Control Policies. This model will work for the policies
written in XACML and having two sections.
1. In ﬁrst section we generate the sets of Requests
2. In second section we check the correctness of the Policies.
Figure 3.1 shows the testing framework called ACPC (Access Control Policy
Checker) for testing the correctness of policy. The input to the framework is
the access control policy that is to be tested. In the request generation phase, this
policy is converted into derived policies and performing the Change-Impact anal-
ysis. The output of this phase is the request suites. In the policy checker phase,
the input is request suites, generated by request generation phase and the policy
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for testing. In the policy checker phase mutation operator is used for producing
mutant (faulty) policy and after generating the response against the request we
compare and evaluate the result for mutant killing, the higher the mutant killing
rate the higher the correctness of the policy under test, so we can say:
Mutant Killing Rate 훼 Correctness of the Policy
Figure 3.1: ACPC (Access Control Policy Checker) Model
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3.3 Request Generation Process
To automatically generate high-quality request suites for access control policies,
we implemented framework based on change-impact analysis. Figure 3.2 shows
the overview of the framework. The framework receives a set of policies under
test and outputs a set of request for policy authors to inspect for correctness.
The framework consists of three major components: derivation, change-impact
analysis and request generation. The key notion of the framework is to derived
two versions of the policy under test in such a way that test coverage targets
(e.g., certain policies, rules, or conditions) are encoded as the diﬀerences of the
two derived versions. A change-impact analysis tool can then be leveraged to
generate counterexamples to witness these diﬀerences. Based on the generated
counterexamples, the framework generates requests [14].
Figure 3.2: Request Generation Process Framework
3.3.1 Derivation
Given the policy under test, the derivation component derives the policy’s versions,
which are later fed to a change-impact analysis tool. The goal is to formulate
the inputs to the change-impact analysis tool so that speciﬁcally targeted parts
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of the policy under test are covered. We provide two variants of version below
called one-to-empty and all-to-negate-one. We discuss their analysis cost and
the situations where they may not work well. Although the framework has been
developed to support multiple policies, to simplify illustration we describe the
derivation variants with the case of a single policy p that contains n rules. To
further illustrate the framework, we provide a concrete example XACML policy
in Figure 3.3. An XACML policy encodes rules in XML syntax. Each rule has a
set of constraints found in the Target elements that must be satisﬁed by a request
in order for that rule to be applied. This example policy has two rules: the ﬁrst
one denies access requests for ”dissemination” of the ”demo:5” resource and the
second one permits all other access requests. The ﬁrst rule is deﬁned by the Rule
element on Line 2 and the Target element on Lines 3-21. The second rule is
deﬁned by the Rule element on Line 23. When multiple rules can be applied on
a request, the decision of the ﬁrst applicable rule will be returned (as speciﬁed by
the ”ﬁrst-applicable” rule combining algorithm on Line 1) [14].
one-to-empty : For each rule r in p, the two synthesized versions are an empty
policy and a policy that contains only r. If r is a permitting rule, the synthesized
empty policy is an empty denying policy. If r is a denying rule, the synthesized
empty policy is an empty permitting policy. The reason for this mechanism is as
follows. Comparing a permitting rule r with an empty permitting policy will not
help generate requests to cover r because no counterexamples are generated for
these two versions. Similarly, comparing a denying rule r with an empty denying
policy will not help generate requests to cover r. This synthesis process is applied
n times. So there are n pairs of policy versions synthesized for p. Consider the
example policy written in XACML in Figure 3.3. The ﬁrst pair of policy versions
synthesized for this policy is an empty permitting policy and the original policy
with Line 23 removed (i.e., the remaining rules). Applying change-impact analysis
on each pair has low cost because each version contains only a single rule. Note
that this variant does not take into account the interactions among diﬀerent rules
unlike the all-to-negate-one variant below.
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Figure 3.3: An example XACML policy
all-to-negate-one : For each rule r in p, the two synthesized versions are p and
p where the decision of r is negated. This process is applied n times so there
are n pairs of policy versions synthesized for p. Again, consider the example
policy in Figure 3.3. The ﬁrst pair of policy versions synthesized for this policy
is the original policy and the original policy with the eﬀect on Line 2 changed to
”Permit”. Applying change-impact analysis on each pair has higher cost than the
one-to-empty variant because the analysis complexity is heavily dependent on the
size of the two versions rather than the diﬀerences between the two versions. Note
that this variant takes into account interactions among diﬀerent rules. This variant
should be at least as good as the one-to-empty variant in terms of achieving policy
structural coverage and fault detection but it will have a higher computational
31
3.3 Request Generation Process
cost, especially for large, complex policies.
The preceding two variants are speciﬁcally developed for achieving high rule
coverage. Because the coverage of a rule implies the coverage of the policy that
contains the rule, our two variants also indirectly target at achieving high policy
coverage [22].
3.3.2 Change-Impact Analysis
Given two versions of a policy, Change-Impact analysis tool [14] outputs coun-
terexamples that illustrate semantic diﬀerences between the two policies. More
speciﬁcally, each counterexample represents a request that evaluates to a diﬀerent
response when applied to the two policy versions. For example, a particular re-
quest r evaluates to permit for policy p but the same request evaluates to deny for
policy p’. Change-impact analysis is usually performed on mature policies that are
undergoing maintenance or updates to avoid accidental injection of anomalies. In
our case, we exploit the functionality of change-impact analysis to automatically
generate access requests by iteratively manipulating the inputs to a change-impact
analysis tool.
We use tool Margrave’s API to perform a change-impact analysis on the origi-
nal policy and each of the policy versions. Based on the counterexample produced
by Margrave, the request generator generates request. Exactly one request is gen-
erated from each version. Margrave package running in PLT scheme with drscheme
package and for generation counterexample CUDD tool is necessary.
3.3.3 Request Generation
Given two policies, a change-impact analysis tool outputs counterexamples that
are evaluated to diﬀerent responses against these two policies. We generate re-
quests based on these counterexamples. Some change-impact analysis tools may
produce abstract counterexamples, which are not immediately ready to be trans-
lated into a concrete request. For example, a change-impact analysis tool may
produce an abstract counterexample [27] for the policy in Figure 3.3 like if ((re-
source == demo:5) (action== dissemination)), deny becomes permit. Then we
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need to solve the constraint and derive one request (or optionally more requests)
for the constraint. Other change-impact analysis tools may produce counterexam-
ples at the concrete level, being the same as the level of requests. Our implemen-
tation leverages a change-impact analysis tool that produces counterexamples at
the concrete level so we do not need to refer to a constraint solver to map from
counterexamples to requests.
3.4 Policy Testing Process
Figure 3.4: Policy Mutation Testing Framework
Mutation testing has historically been applied to general purpose programming
languages. The program under test is iteratively mutated to produce numerous
mutants, each containing one fault.
A test input is independently executed on the original program and each mu-
tant program. If the output of a test executed on a mutant diﬀers from the output
of the same test executed on the original program, then the fault is detected and
the mutant is said to be killed.
The fundamental premise of mutation testing as stated by Geist et al. [28] is
that, in practice, if the software contains a fault, there will usually be a set of
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mutants that can only be killed by a test that also detects that fault. In other
words, the ability to detect small, minor faults such as mutants implies the ability
to detect complex faults. Because fault detection is the central focus of any testing
process, mutation testing provides an external measure of the eﬀectiveness of that
process. The higher the percentage of killed mutants, the more eﬀective the test
set is at fault detection.
In policy mutation testing, the program under test, test inputs, and test out-
puts correspond to the policy, requests, and responses, respectively. An overview
of our framework for policy mutation testing is illustrated in Figure 3.4. In the
framework, we ﬁrst deﬁne a set of mutation operators, whose details are described
in Section 3.4.1. Given a policy and a set of mutation operators, a mutator gen-
erates a number of mutant policies. Given a request set, we evaluate each request
in the request set on both the original policy and a mutant policy. The request
evaluation produces two responses for the request based on the original policy
and the mutant policy, respectively. If these two responses are diﬀerent, then we
determine that the mutant policy is killed by the request; otherwise, the mutant
policy is not killed.
Unfortunately, there are various expenses and barriers associated with muta-
tion testing. The ﬁrst and foremost is the generation and execution of a large
number of mutants. For general-purpose programming languages, the number of
mutants is proportional to the product of the number of data references and the
number of data objects in the program [29]. For XACML policies, the number
of mutants is proportional to the number of policy elements, namely policy sets,
policies, targets, rules, conditions, and their associated attributes.
3.4.1 Mutation operator Handler
Mutation operators describe modiﬁcation rules for modifying access control poli-
cies to introduce faults into the policies. Previous studies [30] have been conducted
to investigate the types and eﬀectiveness of various mutation operators for general-
purpose programming languages; however, these mutation operators often do not
directly apply to mutating policies. This section describes the chosen mutation
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Table 3.1: Index of Mutation Operators
ID Description
PSTT Policy Set Target True. The policy set is applied to all re-
quest.
PSTF Policy Set Target False. The policy set is not applied to any
requests.
PTT Policy Target True. The policy is applied to all requests.
PTF Policy Target False. The policy is not applied to any requests.
RTT Rule Target True. The rule is applied to all requests.
RTF Rule Target False. The rule is not applied to any requests.
RCT Rule Condition True. The condition always evaluates to true.
RCF Rule Condition True. The condition always evaluated to
false.
CRE Change Rule Eﬀect. The rule eﬀect is inverted (e.g. permit
for deny).
operators for XACML policies that implement our fault model. An index of the
mutation operators is listed in Table 3.1 and their details are described below. The
ﬁrst eight mutation operators emulate syntactic faults because these mutation op-
erators manipulate the predicates found in the target and condition elements. In
particular, PSTT, PSTF, PTT, PTF, RTT, RTF, RCT, and RCF emulate syntac-
tic faults as simple typos in the policy set, policy, and rule target elements as well
as the condition elements which result in the predicates found in those elements
to always evaluate to true or false [14].
The last mutation operator CRE, emulate semantic faults because they manipu-
late the logical constructs of XACML policies.
Policy Set Target True (PSTT) : Ensure that the policy set is applied to all
requests by removing the <Target> tag of each PolicySet element. The number
of mutants created by this operator is equal to the number of PolicySet elements
with a Target tag.
Policy Set Target False (PSTF) : Ensure that the policy set is never applied to
a request by modifying the <Target> tag of each PolicySet element. The number
of mutants created by this operator is equal to the number of PolicySet elements.
Policy Target True (PTT) : Ensure that the policy is applied to all requests
simply by removing the <Target> tag of each Policy element. The number of
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mutants created by this operator is equal to the number of Policy elements with
a Target tag. Policy Target False (PTF). Ensure that the policy is never applied
to a request by modifying the <Target> tag of each Policy element. The number
of mutants created by this operator is equal to the number of Policy elements.
Rule Target True (RTT) : Ensure that the rule is applied to all requests sim-
ply by removing the <Target> tag of each Rule element. The number of mutants
created by this operator is equal to the number of Rule elements with a <Target>
tag.
Rule Target False (RTF) : Ensure that the rule is never applied to a request
by modifying the <Target> tag of each Rule element. The number of mutants
created by this operator is equal to the number of Rule elements.
Rule Condition True (RCT) : Ensure that the condition always evaluates to
True simply by removing the condition of each Rule element. The number of
mutants created by this operator is equal to the number of Rule elements with a
<Condition> tag.
Rule Condition False (RCF) : Ensure that the condition always evaluates to
False by manipulating the condition value or the condition function. The number
of mutants created by this operator is equal to the number of Rule elements.
Change Rule Eﬀect (CRE) : Invert each rule’s Eﬀect by changing Permit to
Deny or Deny to Permit. The number of mutants created by this operator is equal
to the number of rules in the policy. This operator should never create equivalent
mutants unless a rule is unreachable, a strong indication of an error in the policy
speciﬁcation.
These entire mutation operators are used for our Mutation testing framework.
The Mutation operator handler contain one more component called Mutant, which
is responsible for creating the mutant (faulty) policy, by taking input as the original
policy and mutation operator.
3.4.2 Mutant and Original Policy Veriﬁcation
In this section, we will discuss the veriﬁcation of original XACML policy and
Mutant XACML policy. After getting the mutant policy generated by Mutation
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Operator Handler, we need the response against all the requests generated by
Request Generation phase. Therefore, we need the OASIS XACML tool for veri-
ﬁcation and getting the response. The working principle of OASIS XACML tool
is; It gives the response when we provide policy and request as input to the tool
the output of the OASIS XACML tool is the response in XACML language as we
have seen in Chapter 2. We use this principle for verifying the Mutant policy
and Original policy by supplying the same request set for getting the response.
This is very simple process and it worked just like Access Control System.
3.4.3 Diﬀerence Checker
The work of diﬀerence checker is very simple; it only compares the response of the
Mutant policies and Original policy against same request set. It returns 1 if both
the response is diﬀerent otherwise return 0. The mutant killing rate is calculated
by number of 1, if the number of 1 is more we say that the mutant killing rate is
more. We can formulate the mutant killing rate as;
푀푢푡푎푛푡 퐾푖푙푙푖푛푔 푟푎푡푒(푚푘 푟푎푡푒) =
#푀푢푡푎푛푡 퐾푖푙푙푒푑
#푀푢푡푎푛푡 푃표푙푖푐푖푒푠
The mk rate is easily calculated with the help of above formula and by multi-
plying by 100 we can ﬁnd the mutant killing percentage (i.e. mk%).
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen the detailed description about the ACPC (Access
Control Policy Checker), which is the model for policy testing. ACPC have mainly
two phases; ﬁrst one is for generating the request set and the second phase is
for performing the testing. In this chapter we have describe the nine mutation
operators that we have used for performing the mutation testing.
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Chapter 4
Implementation of ACPC
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe the working principle and implementation detail of
ACPC (Access Control Policy Checker). We have seen the working of diﬀerent
components of ACPC in the previous chapter. Now we will discuss about:
1. Diﬀerent sample policies those have used as a standard for testing.
2. How request suites has been generated by ﬁrst phase and,
3. How we test the policy in second phase, with the help of one XACML sample
policy [22].
4.2 Sample Policies
We used nine XACML policies collected from three diﬀerent sources as subjects
in our experiment [14]. Table 4.1 summarizes the basic statistics of each policy.
The ﬁrst column shows the subject names.
Columns 2-5 show the numbers of policy sets, policies, rules, and conditions,
respectively. Four of the policies, namely codeA, codeB, codeC, and codeD are
examples used by Fisler et al. The remaining policies are examples of real XACML
policies used by Fedora. Fedora is open source software that gives organizations a
ﬂexible service-oriented architecture for managing and delivering digital content.
Fedora uses XACML to provide ﬁne-grained access control to the digital content
that it manages. The Fedora repository of default and example XACML policies
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Table 4.1: List of Policies used in the Experiment
Policy #policy set #policy #rule #condition
codeA 5 2 2 0
codeB 11 5 5 0
codeC 8 4 4 0
codeD 11 5 5 0
default-2 1 13 13 12
demo-11 0 1 3 4
demo-26 0 1 2 2
demo-5 0 1 3 4
mod-fedora 1 12 12 10
provides a useful resource of realistic subjects. All these policies are suitable for
implementing the mutation operator that we have chosen for mutation testing.
Figure 4.1 shows an example XACML policy, which is revised and simpliﬁed
from a sample Fedora policy. This policy has one policy element, which in turn
contains two rules. The rule combining algorithm is ”ﬁrst-applicable”, meaning
that the decision of the ﬁrst applicable rule encountered during evaluation is re-
turned. Lines 2-13 deﬁne the policy’s target, which indicates that this policy only
applies to those access requests of a resource ”demo:5”. The target of Rule 1
(Lines 15-25) further narrows the scope of applicable requests to those requesting
to perform a ”Dissemination” action on resource ”demo:5”. Its condition (Lines
26-35) indicates that if the subject’s ”loginId” is ”testuser1”, ”testuser2”, or ”fe-
doraAdmin”, then the request should be denied. Otherwise, according to Rule
2 (Line 37) and the rule combining algorithm of the policy (Line 1), a request
applicable to the policy should be permitted. In the original demo-5.xml XACML
policy, 3 rules are there, here we have taken two for the sake of creating example.
This example is describes here for the sake of readers to understand about the
structure of the XACML policies. Next section is all about the actual implemen-
tation of our model with the help of Margrave tool and XACML tool.
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Figure 4.1: An example of XACML Policy (demo-5.xml)
4.3 Request Sets
The request generation process is very important and very necessary process of
any testing weather it’s a software testing or is a access control policy testing.
To show the process of request generation here we have taken an example so
that the reader should understand the ACPC framework easily and can relate
it. The sample XACML policy named RPSlist.xml shown in Appendix-A, is the
simple policy to understand. In the RPSlist.xml policy there is sub policies named
RPS Faculty.xml, RPS Student.xml, PPS Faculty.xml, and PPS Student.xml.
For generating request; ﬁrst perform the Change-Impact analysis by Margrave
tool, under which Drscheme is there which is the tool responsible for generating
the counterexample. This counterexample is the raw request material in the form
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Figure 4.2: Generation of counterexample by Margrave tool named Drscheme
of code, again this code is processed and we generate the request.
Figure shows the counterexample generated by change-impact analysis tool,
Margrave’s Drscheme. In this if you will see the original policy RPSlist.xml
is used and we have used the derivation function all-to-negate-one by which
PPS Student.xml Permit rule we have changed to Deny. Because of this de-
rived policy we get P→D symbol in the counterexample shown in the Figure .
The counterexample shown in the Figure is 10101-000 P→D, the code given in
the form of 1 and 0. 1 indicates the presence of action, resource and subject to the
counterexample. In this case action is ”Receive”, resource is ”ExternalGrades”
and subject is ”Student”, so our request in the form of XACML is shown in Figure
4.3.
This is the correct XACML format of request with three attributes subject,
resource and action. This request we pass in to the second phase i.e. policy checker
where we perform mutation testing.
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Figure 4.3: Request generated in XACML form
4.4 Mutation Testing
Mutation testing is performed with the help of mutation operator that we have
already seen in the previous chapters. We take the Change Rule Eﬀect (CRE)
mutation for this example in this the rule’s eﬀect will change and we get mutant
policy named RPSlist1.xml, let’s take the RPSlist.xml’s PPS Student.xml policy’s
rule eﬀect Permit to Deny [14].
After getting the mutant policy we perform the analysis by OASIS XACML
tool for analysis, which gives the output in the form of response. We provide
the policy and the request to the OASIS XACML tool and it gives corresponding
response.
If we observe the Figure 4.4 and 4.5, the response gets by original policy is
Permit, whereas the response of mutation policy is Deny. If we compare both the
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Figure 4.4: Response on Original Policy
Figure 4.5: Response on Mutant Policy
responses are not same, in this way we can say that the mutant is killed.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen the diﬀerent sample policies which are used in the
experiment and actual implementation of ACPC with the help of one example.
The working of Margrave tool and the working of OASIS XACML tool which is
clearly mention and illustrated in the form of ﬁgures.
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Chapter 5
Result and Discussion
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe our result in the form of tables and graphs. Before that
we classify the mutation operators into diﬀerent classes as mentioned in [6] and
we deﬁne some metrics [14] which used in the experiment. Every result contains
the table, followed by graphs and discussion. In the last we conclude our result
by showing the performance of our framework.
5.2 Mutation operator classes
The mutation operators can be classiﬁed based on the policy element on which
the mutation operation is performed. They can be classiﬁed as,
Policy Set Mutation Operators : These represent the mutation operations
that can be done at the policy set level. The various mutation operators deﬁned
for this is shown in Table 5.1. They are, policy set target true mutant in which the
policy set target is removed so that it is always true, policy set target false mutant
in which the target value is changed such that it is always evaluated to false and
change in policy combining algorithm mutant in which mutants are created for
each policy combining algorithm like permit overrides, deny overrides and ﬁrst
applicable.
Policy Mutation Operators : These represent the mutation operations that
can be done at the policy level. The various mutation operators deﬁned for this is
shown in Table 5.2. Those are policy target true and policy target false mutation
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Table 5.1: Policy Set mutation operator
ID Description
PSTT Policy set Target True
PSTF Policy Set Target False
Table 5.2: Policy mutation operator
ID Description
PTT Policy Target True
PTF Policy Target False
operators.
These are similar to the policy set operators except that the granularity is at the
level of policy rather than policy set.
Rule Mutation Operators: These represent the mutation operations that can
be done at the rule level. The various mutation operators deﬁned for this is shown
in Table 5.3. They are rule target true, rule target false, rule condition true,
rule condition false and change rule eﬀect. The ﬁrst two rule operators generate
mutants by setting the rule targets to be true and false. The condition operators
set the condition in each rule to be true or false. The change rule eﬀect changes
a rule with an eﬀect of permit to one with an eﬀect of deny and vice versa.
Table 5.3: Rule mutation operator
ID Description
RTT Rule Target True
RTF Rule Target False
RCT Rule Condition True
RCF Rule Condition False
CRE Change Rule Eﬀect
5.3 Metrics
In order to investigate our hypotheses, we need to measure the coverage metrics
and the mutant killing rate. The following metrics are measured for each policy
under test, each request set, and each mutation operator.
Test count : The test count is the size of the request set or the number of
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Table 5.4: Mutant-kill result achieved by both request set
— Random Method Change-Impact
analysis Method
XACML
Policy
# Mu-
tant
# Mutant
Kill
Mutant
kill %
# Mutant
Kill
Mutant
kill %
codeA 64 20 31.25% 29 45.31%
codeB 92 33 35.87% 42 45.65%
codeC 112 50 44.64% 53 47.32%
codeD 148 55 37.16% 69 46.62%
default-2 157 10 6.37% 85 54.14%
demo-11 22 16 72.73% 16 72.73%
demo-26 17 09 52.94% 09 52.94%
demo-5 23 17 73.91% 19 82.61%
mod-fedora 157 35 22.29% 82 52.23%
average 41.90% 55.50%
generated tests. For testing access control policies, a test is synonymous with
request.
Reduced-test count : Given a policy and the generated set of requests, the
reduced test count is the size of the reduced request set based on policy coverage.
Mutant count : Given a policy under test and with the mutant operators the
numbers of mutant policies are Mutant count.
Mutant-killing ratio : Given a request set, the policy under test, and the set
of generated mutants, the mutant-killing ratio is the number of mutants killed by
the request set divided by the total number of mutants.
5.4 Fault Detection Capability Comparison
In Table 5.4 summarizes the two approaches of request generation method by its
mutant killing ability which is some how similar as [22]. Column 2 shows the
number of mutant policy generated by the Mutation operator Handler it depends
upon the policy attributes namely policy set, policy, target and conditions, more
the attribute more the mutant policies. Columns 3-4 shows the mutant killed and
mutant killed% by request set generated by random method, similarly columns 5-6
shows the mutant killed and mutant killed% by request set generated by change-
impact analysis method.
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Figure 5.1: Comparison between Random and Change-Impact method
It’s observe from the table that, when the mutant kill is higher then the per-
centage of the mutant kill is also higher. Therefore, we can say that the average
mutant killing% of change-impact analysis method is greater than that of ran-
dom method. Some time the request generated by random method is same as the
change-impact analysis method, in the row of demo-11 and demo-26 the killing%
is same. But in the case of default-2 there is the huge change, it varies from 6.3%
to 54.14%. We can say that our method works well in all the cases and gives good
result compare to random method. The graph between sample XACML policies
and mutant kill percentage by both methods are shown in Figure 5.1, the dif-
ference between random and change-impact method are clearly visible in Figure
5.1.
5.5 Classiﬁed Mutantion Operators
As we have classiﬁed the mutant operator into three classes [6] Policy Set muta-
tion operator, Policy mutation operator and Rule mutation operator. The main
objective of making the class is to check the performance of mutant killing. Table
5.5 shows the individual mutant operator performance in all sample ACML poli-
cies and Table 5.6 shows the classiﬁed structure is mutant operators. According
to each table there is the graph which shows the performance between sample
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Table 5.5: Mutant-kill percentage of all XACML policies by individual Mutation
Operators
Mutation Operators Random method Change-Impact
method
PSTT 64.23% 64.23%
PSTF 61.83% 63.58%
PTT 81.36% 98.14%
PTF 75.6% 96.48%
RTT 72.84% 26.44%
RTF 63.48% 90.14%
RCT 31.23% 12.94%
RCF 77.16% 98.14%
CRE 71.14% 90.88%
Table 5.6: Mutant-kill percentage by Mutation Operators
XACML Policy Rule opera-
tor kill %
Policy opera-
tor kill %
Policy Set operator
kill %
codeA 89.14% 26.36% 20.43%
codeB 81.08% 27.9% 27.97%
codeC 78.14% 31.24% 32.58%
codeD 80.88% 31.01% 27.97%
default-2 50.94% 30.4% 81.08%
demo-11 88.28% 57.18% -
demo-26 56.28% 49.6% -
demo-5 98.14% 67.08% -
mod-fedora 65.6% 25.6% 22.29%
XACML policies and Mutant killing percentage (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.3) and
between Mutation Operators and Mutation killing percentage (Figure 5.2).
The result of Table 5.6 and corresponding graph shows that Rule mutation
operator gives higher mutant killing percentage than Policy Set mutation operator
and Rule mutation operator. The conclusion is that the mutation operator that we
have chosen the Rule mutation operator works well and with the help of these ﬁve
mutation operator we can perform the policy testing, which gives the approximate
same result as with the all mutant operator, but take less cost and less time.
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Figure 5.2: Fault detection of all policies by individual mutation operator
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen the diﬀerent result set which compares the result of
the framework and random method which has been used so fare. The framework
gives better result in the form of greater mutant killing rate with the good quality
request set generated by change-impact analysis method.We have classiﬁed the
mutation operator [6] by which, Rule mutation operator gives better performance
then the Policy Set mutation operator and Policy mutation operator. The whole
result shown in the form of tables and graphs in this Chapter.
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Figure 5.3: Mutant-killing ratio by diﬀerent class of operators
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Conclusion and Future Work
Policy testing is a practical technique for the quality assurance of access control
policies. In this thesis, we analysis a method ACPC that uses policy programs for
testing access control policies. An automated tool has been developed based on
this method. Given a policy, ACPC can generate an optimal number of requests for
testing the policy. The advantage of that approach is that, we use existing software
testing techniques that are being used for testing diﬀerent software applications.
Also, this approach is general and can be applied for testing most Role based
policy speciﬁcations even in other languages.
We evaluate the method by testing with nine XACML policies. We perform
mutation testing on the policies and the generated request sets and compare the
results with the other existing techniques as analysis. The mutant kill percentage
is as good as or better than existing techniques in most of the cases. Also, the
results indicate that the mutants created by the rule operator have more kill
percentage than that achieved by other operators. This shows that the use of the
policy program for generating test cases is able to capture ﬁne errors created by
mutants. We got up to 98% of mutant killed by the rule mutation operator and
this classiﬁcation [6] gives better performance in terms of cost and time.
In future, we want to develop the better coverage tool based on the some
improved criteria. The stronger the coverage criteria, the better will be the quality
of the test cases (responses) generated. Also, we will deﬁne some new mutation
operator so that our framework will become more cost-eﬀective and accurate for
testing the access control policies.
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Sample XACML policy
Figure A.1: RPSlist.xml
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Figure A.2: RPS Student.xml
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Figure A.3: RPS Faculty.xml
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Figure A.4: PPS Student.xml
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Figure A.5: PPS Facilty.xml
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